Quarterhorse in Vietnam

1st SQUADRON

4th CAVALRY

QUARTERHORSE

1/4 Cavalvry After Action Report - WILLISTON - 19 Feb 67


 
                                    HEADQUARTERS
                              1ST SQUADRON 4TH CAVALRY
                                     APO 96345
                                                                  19 February 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (OP WILLISTON)


TO: 3d Bde,1st Inf Div
    ATTN:  S-3
    APO 96345


1.	(C) OPORD 3-67 (OP WILLISTON) Hq 1/4 Cav, dtd 31 Jan 67, 1/4 Cav reinforced 
opcon 3d Bde from 1 Feb to 121700 Feb 67.

2.	(C) Dates: 1 Feb through 12 Feb 67.

3.	(C) General: 1/4 Cay conducted road clearing, reconnaissance in force and 
provided security as directed  in OPORD 3-67 (OP WILLISTON) your hq, dtd 30 Jan 67.

           a.	Reporting Officer: LTC Thomas Fife.

           b.	Task Org:
                  Hq Trp: Opt Dudley M. Andres.
                  Trp A (-) Cpt Rodney W. Symons - detached to 2/28th Inf on 11 Feb 67.
                  Trp B: Cpt Harold W. Wilkens - joined from opcon 2/28th mt
                  Trp C: Cpt Jack Dice.
                  Trp D (air): Maj Robert Oberg - frequently opcon Div and Bde's 
                               throughout the operation.
                  A/5/2 Arty (AWSP): Cpt John F Gulla.
                  C/5/2 Arty (AWSP)(-): Cpt Richard C. Stehbacher, released opcon 
                               10 Feb 67.
                  A/1/l6th Inf:  CPT Robert E. Williamson, released 
                                 opcon on 10 Feb 67.
                  A/2/28th Inf:  Cpt Don E. Sawtelle, opcon on 10 Feb 67.

           c.	Squadron Command Group consisted of LTC Thomas W. Fife, Squadron 
Commander; Maj Robert Reed Squadron Executive Officer; Maj Vernon E Ebert Squadron 
S-3; Cpt Samuel D. Wi1der Squadron S-2; Cpt David Kelly squadron S-1; Cpt Charles 
B. Fegen Squadron  S-4; Cpt George Moffitt Squadron Communication Officer.

4.	Intelligence:

 	a.  Enemy Situation: avai1ab1e information prior to commencement of 
Operation Williston indicated that a battalion of  the 273d VC Regiment and 
e1ements of the 272d VC Regiment were located in the proposed operations area. 
Photo readouts revealed the existence of tunnels and bunkers within the area 
of operations. 

	b.	Enemy situation during, the operation:  Enemy activity was 
limited because of the Tet (Lunar New Year) cease fire, however, there were 
2 contacts which resulted in cease Fire vio1ations by the VC. One violation 
involved a unit moving to pick up supp1ies.

	c.	Terrain: The area of operation was generally gent1e sloping, 
terrain covered by sparse jungle and rubber plantations. Roads, jungle trail 
and rubber plantations were traversable. Jungle covered terrain could be 
traversed with track vehicles one exception being ground adjacent to creek 
beds which was unfordable without adequate Engineer support.

	d.	Weather: Weather during the period of the operation was hot and 
humid during the day. Nights were cool commensurate with the season.

5.	Mission: 1/4 Cav reinforced completed all missions assigned. Missions
consisted of: S&D operations in sector, clearing and securing Hwy 13 in AO by 
1000 hrs daily.

6.	Concept of Operations:

	a.	Maneuver: Operation conducted in two phases:

		(1.	Phase I: 31-1 Feb, at 311300 C Trp sweeps Hwy 13 to Bau
Bang, escorts Arty Btry to Arty Base I, secured Arty Btry and Rte 13 to Arty 
Base I. 010600 Feb, Sqdn (-.) moves to AO, secures LZ, l&2 by 011045 Feb 67.

		(2.	Phase II: 1-12 Feb sqdn secures Hwy 13 in LO by conducting
S&D opns in areas adjacent to route during daylight hours, and by patroling and 
outposting the route during hours of darkness and by sweeping the road each morning 
to be comp1eted NLT 1000 hrs daily.

7.	Execution:

	a.	31 Jan through 1 Feb 67: C Troop swept Hwy 13 to Bau Bang,
escorted arty btry to Bau Bang, secured arty btry and Hwy 13.
		1 Feb: Sqdn (-) moved to AO and secured LZ's north of AO by 1045 hrs.
		1-12	Feb: With two troops, one btry (AWSP), and one Inf Co. the 
sqdn outposted Hwy 13, clearing and securing the route prior to 1000 hrs daily. 
Carried out S~D opns to enhance security of Hwy 13. Also provided RF for the defense 
of  Lai Khe by stationing one unit (-) in Lai Khe at  night. Enemy contact was 
sporadic with more frequent encounters in the northern portion of the sqdn AO 
(XT 784494 to XT 786481). VO killed and captured are noted in para 9 below. All VC 
killed were caught in ambush whi1e traversing known VC trails crossing Hwy 13.

8.	(C) Support: Artillery units of the lst Inf Div arty provided artillery 
preparations and Fire support on call.   7th AF povided TAC  support. Prep and 
strikes were on call and prep1anned.

9.      Results: 
		US casualties:	6 WIA, 2 NBC's.
		US Equipment Lost:	1 M48A3 tank heavily damaged.

		VC Casualties:	12 KIA.
		Other VC Losses: 6 VCS, 8 weapons, 10 full 3Ord magazines captured 
and 23 bags of mail, documents, and miscellaneous personal equipment. The following 
was destroyed: 2 bunkers, 3 - 81mm rds, 3 AT mines, 11 AP mines and 1 grenade.

10.	(C) Admin and Log Matters:

	a.	Admin and logistical plans were adequate.
		(1.	Classes I, II, and V were carried by troops as basic load. 
Logistical resupply was accomplished primarily by use of land lines of communication 
from Lai Khe.  Lai Khe logistical facilities proved adequate to support the units 
logistical needs.
		(2.	Maintenance: Maintenance on our vehicles was excellent using 
the new consolidated PLL in the CP. The overall maintenance posture was excellent.	
		(3.	Treatment of Casualties: The forward aid station and surgeon 
were with the squadron command group. Routine sick call was held and referrals were 
made to B Company Med 1. There were no unusual routine or emergency treatment problems 
encountered.
		(4.	Transportation: Re-supply was primarily effected by truck and 
proved to be excellent.
		(5.	Communication: Excellent radio communications were maintained. 
Contact was maintained with Phu Loi base station throughout the entire operation.
		(6. Medical Evacuation: Evacuation of routine medical problems was on 
supply vehicles or helicopters to La.i. Khe or Phu Loi. Dust-Off w~s used only for 
severe emergencies, both day and night.

	b.	Personnel analysis:
		ORGAINISATION DESIGNATOR   INITIAL           TERMINATION                                            
                  1/4 Cav:  Authorized .....1019   		1019
               	  Assigned..................1060	        1032
              	  PDY        ...............1015		 993
              	  PIF        ................690                 668
              	  PBC  Hq Trp  ...............55                  55
              	       Trp A      ............11                  11
              	       Trp B      ............17                  19
              	       Trp C      ............15                  15
              	       Trp D      ...........184                 185
              	       Btry A/5/2 ............24                  24
      
      A recurring problem which we face is the shortage of personnel necessary 
      to make 5 man crews for all our  ACAV's. Five personnel to fight on the 
      vehicle and for dismounted operations. 

11. Special Equipment and techniques:  None

12.	Conclusions and Lessons Learned:

	a.	Conclusions:  Omitted
	b.	Lessons Learned: None



                                                         /signed by
							Thomas W. Fife
                         				LTC, Armor
							Commanding


Memorandum for all Officer and Enlisted Men, 1/4th Cav

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