Quarterhorse in Vietnam



1/4 Cavalvry After Action Report - JUNCTION CITY II - 26 Apr 67

                              1st Squadron 4th Cavalry
                                     APO 96345

                                                                      26 Apr 1967

SUBJECT:  After Action Report (OP Junction City II)

TO: 	CG 1st Inf Div
	APO 96345
	ATTN:  S-3
1.	(C)  OPORD 4-47 (OP Junction City II) Hq 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, dtd 16 
March 1967.

2.	(U)  Dates  18 March through 15 April 1967

3.	General:  Initially the 1/4 Cav under operational control of the 1st 
Bde moved to Quan Loi and with one Troop secured a portion of the Quan Loi 
perimeter and conducted road clearing operations and convoy security.  Later 
in the operation, the squadron with three units under operational control 
conducted route clearing and security, convoy escort, security of Arty base 
at XT624814 and Arty base at An Loc.

During the last period of the operation the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav was under the 
operational control of 11th ACR.  During this period the 1/4 Cav cleared and 
secured Hwy 13 in sector and secured the Arty Base at XT736816.

	a.	Reporting Officer:  LTC Thomas W. Fife

	b.	Task Org:

				Hq Trp		CPT George S. Moffitt
				Trp A		CPT Rodney W. Symons
				Trp B		CPT James Skillings
				Trp C		CPT Jack Dice (Until CPT Glen 
                                      Yarborough assumed Command on 15 April)
				Trp D (Air)	MAJ Robert Oberg (opcon to Div 
                                      or Bde's throughout The operation)

4.	Enemy Activities:  The Viet Cong Forces, elements of 9th VC Division 
and local forces in the eastern portion of War Zone "C" in Operation Junction 
City II conducted counter sweep action in limited force only.  The actions were 
characteristic of those encountered in Operation Junction City I.  1st Sqdn, 
4th Cav elements conducting convoy escort, route security and ready reaction
force type missions encountered mines and RPG-2 and recoilless rifle fire but 
established no significant contacts. Two mortar and recoilless rifle attacks 
using M-70 or rifle grenade fire were launched against the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav 
night perimeter which resulted in 1 WIA and no damages.  The ineffectiveness 
of the Viet Cong fire was apparent during the first attack when almost all 
mortar rounds were outside the Sqdn perimeter, or were tree bursts.

	a.	Weather:  The weather conditions during Operation Junction City 
II were characterized by a warm humid atmosphere which contributed to occasional 
heavy early morning ground fog. 

	b.	Terrain:  The terrain was dry and facilitated mobility throughout 
the operation. The dryness of the terrain did create severe dust conditions.

5.	Mission:  In conjunction with TF DIXIE, provide security for Quan Loi base 
and convoy escort along Rte 246 and 303.  Be prepared to assist 173rd Abn Bde in 
security of Rte 245 20 March 1967.  Op order secure FSP-E vic XT7882 on or about 
22 March 1967.

6.	Concept of Operation:  1/4 Cav with one troop under operational control 
secures Quan Loi Base and escort convoys along Rte 246.

7.	Execution:

	18 March 67:  1/4 Cav (-) moved to and secured Quan Loi.

	19 March 67:  1/4 Cav (-) with Co. B 1/26 Inf and B 3/1 Cav (ARVN) attached 
conducted road clearing and security, and escorted convoys between An Loc - Minh 
Thanh & An Loc and CP14 (XT563843).

	20-26 March:  The 1/4 Cav (-) secured Quan Loi; cleared and secured road and 
escorted convoys between An Loc and CP14 (XT563843). 

	27 Mar to 12 Apr 67:  1/4 Cav initially with Trps A, C and one Inf Co. (Mech) 
and later with 3 Troops conducted road clearing and security, excorted resupply 
convoy, installation security and limited S&D operations in designated areas.

	12-15 Apr 67:  The 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav opcon to 11th ACR, cleared and secured 
Hwy 13 in sector and secured Arty Base at XT736216.

	15 Apr 67:  1/4 Cav cleared and secured road from An Loc to XT765720 and 
escorted Artillery units from An Loc to Lai Khe.  The 1/4 Cav terminated 
participation in Junction City II and moved to Phu Loi.  Sqdn CP closed into Phu 
Loi at (unreadable) without incidents or enemy contact. 

There were no enemy contact of significance during Junction City II.  The only 
casualties were due to enemy sniper and attack with recoilless rifles. (rest of 
para unreadable)
8.	(C)  Support:  Artillery units of the 1st Inf Div arty provided artillery 
operations and fire support on call.  7th AF provided TAC air support.  Prep and 
strikes were on call and pre-planned. 

9.	Results:  

	US casualties:  2 KIA, 25 WIA
	US equipment lost:  5 M48A3 Damaged, 6 M113 (1 Destroyed, 5 Damaged)

	VC casualties:  None
	Other VC losses:  14 AT mines

10.	(C)  Admin and Log matters: 

	a.	Admin and log plans were adequate.

		(1)	Classes I, II and V were carried initially during Junction 
City II or basic load. 

		(2)	Maintenance:  Maintenance was a serious problem during 
Junction City I, but was adequate during Junction City II.  During Junction City I 
serious shortages of tank track and right and left front road wheel arms developed 
as a result of mine damage.  The problem was kept within bounds through the 
conversion of intermediate road wheel arms into front road wheel arms by a 
complicated welding conversion. 

		(3)	Treatment of Casualties:  The forward aid station and 
surgeon were with the squadron command group.  Routine sick call was held and 
routine referrals were made in supporting medical company.  There were no unusual 
routine or emergency treatment problems encountered.

		(4)	Transportation:  Re-supply was primarily  effected by truck 
and proved to be excellent.

		(5)	Communication:  Excellent radio communication were maintained. 
Contact was retained with Phu Loi base station throughout both operations.

		(6)	Medical Evacuation:  Evacuation of routine medical problems 
were by supply vehicles or helicopters.  Dust Off was used for day and night 

	b.	Personnel analysis:

		1/4 Cav Authorized		 930		    930
              		Assigned		 955		    931
              		PDY			 821		    821
              		PIF			 510		    515
		 Hq			          83		     82
                  A			          22		     11
                  B			          30		     28
                  C                               16                 33
                  D                              160                152

11.	Special Equipment and techniques:  None

12.	Conclusions and Lessons Learned:

	a.	Conclusions:  Omitted
	b.	Lessons Learned:  Omitted

						\signed for: by Thomas L. Silva
						David S. Kelly
						CPT, Armor

Note:  This is a copy of the original made by Bill Baty on 13 Nov 2000 using OCR.


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