Quarterhorse in Vietnam




1/4 Cavalvry After Action Report - MANHATTAN - 28 May 67

                                  1st Squadron 4th Cavalry
                                        APO SF 96345
                                                                    28 May 1967

SUBJECT:	Combat After Action Report (OP MANHATTAN)

Comnanding General
1st Inf Div 
APO 96345

1.	OPORD 06-67 (OP MANHATTAN) Hq 11th ACR, dtd 19 Apr 67.

2.	Dates: 20 Apr through 11 May 67.

3.	General: The 1/4 Cav under the operational control of  the 11th ACR, 
escorted artillery and  engineer units from Lai Khe to Ben Cui. During the 
operation, the 1/4 Cav secured FSB 0, 11th ACR CP, cleared and outposted  
route from FSB 0 to 11th ACR daily; secured Engineer working parties and 
conducted S&D operations in designaited AO's.

	a.	Reporting Officer: LTC Thomas W. Fife.

	b.	Task Org:

         		     Hq Trp		  CPT George S. Moffitt
                             Trp A		  CPT  Rodney W. Symons
			     Trp C		  CPT Glen Yarborough
			     Co B/2/2 Inf (Mech)  CPT John R. Gallagher,Jr. 

4. Enemy Activities: Enemy activities throughout the Squadron's area of 
operations consisted primarily of the mining of roads. There were 2 attacks 
with RPG-2 and. Anti-tank grenades, both of which failed.

There were 3 incidents in which the Squadron Commander's Command and Control 
helicopter received ground fire. There were hits on the aircraft in 2 incidents.

On 29 April 1967, Troop C, with 1 platoon of 919 Engineer Company attached, 
engaged local. administration elements of the VC Binh Duong Province vic XT558547.  
VC losses as a result of the action were: 12 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC (POW), 2 VC WIA 
(POW); I US AR 15, 1 US Ml carbine, 1 US pistol cal .45, 1 Chicom Type 53 carbine, 
1 Chicom SMG, Type 50. There were 26 detainees classified as draft dodgers and 
were evacuated by or to RVN National Police.

5.	Mission:

  	(1)	Escort artillery and engineer convoy from Lai Khe to forward 
assembly area vicinity Ben Cui on 20-21 April
(2)	Escort convoy containing 11th AC Regiment CP and Squadron trains
from Lai Khe to CP/Trains location vicinity Dau Tieng on 21-22 April. Provide 
security for 11th AC Regiment CP/Trains area.

	(3)	 Seize end secure 11th AC Regiment CP/Trains area by 220800 
hours for arrival of advance party by helicopter.

	(4)	Provide security for engineer work parties preparing FSB 0 
and working in  AO OSCAR beginning on 21 April.

	(5)	Secure location from Dau Tieng FSA to FSB 0.

	(6)	Attach 3 tanks to engineer work parties (clearing teams) 
on 21 April.

	(7)	Be prepared to conduct S&D in AO OSCAR.

6. Concept of operations: 1/4 Cavalry with two cavalry troops, one Infantry 
Company (Mechanized) and one platoon of AWSP under operational control escort 
artillery Engineers and 11th ACR to vicinity Dau Tieng, and provide security 
and conduct S&D operations as require by OPORD 09-67 (OP MANHATTAN Hq 11th ACR 
dtd 19 April 67 and subsequent frag orders.

7. Execution:

	a.	20 April: 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry with one Cavalry Troop and 
one Infantry Company (Mechanized) escorted Artillery, Engineers and a team of 
C/7O1st to Ben Cui.

	b.	21 April: 1 /4 (-) arrived to Ben Cui with escorted units. Troop 
A escorted 11th ACR CP and trains from Bien Hoa to field location vicinity Dau 
Tieng. No enemy contact was made during the march and all elements closed into 
their field locations without incident.

	c.	22 April to 10 May 67: 1/4 Cavalry conducted road sweeping and 
route security; security of Engineer work sites; convoy escort; perimeter security 
and limited S&D operations in AO.
	d.	10 April B/2/2 escorted convoys to Lai Khe and Di An. Released
opcon 1/4 Cavalry.

	e.	11 April: 1/4 Cav moved from FSB 0 to Phu Loi and escorted Artillery 
and Engineer units to Di An and Phu Loi. Closed Phu Loi 1835 hours without enemy 
contact or incidents.

8.	Support: Artillery units of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery provided 
artillery preparations and fire support on call. 7th Air Force provided TAC air 
support Prep and strikes were on call and pre-planned.

9.   Results:		US Losses
                         Personnel - 4 WIA

      			 Equipment - 1 M42 Damaged by mine
                            	     2 M48A3 Damaged by mine
                                     1 M113 Damaged by mine

			VC Losses

			 Personnel - 12 VC KIA (BC)
       				      2 VC WIA (BC) (POW)
                                     26 VCS
                                      8 VC (Pow)
                                      1 Chieu Hoi

			Equipment -  1 Booby Trap
                		    50 Pungi Pits
                		    18 AT mines
                		     9 Bicycles
                                     5 Uniforms
                                     3 Huts destroyed
                                   120 Rounds Chicom 7.62
                                     2 US Helmuts
                                     1 Machete
                                     4 tunnels
                		    69 Bunkers
                		    12 Butterfly bombs
                 		     2 8" Artillery rounds
                		     1 Pair black pajamas
                                     1 Tool bag
                 		     7 AP mines
                		     8 Base camps
                 		     3 4.2 mortar rounds
                		     1 Shape charge
                 		     7 Weapons
                                     1 ox-cart
                 		    14 Rounds cal .45
                 	 	     3 Rounds RPG-2
               			     6 VC villages
                                     6 Foxholes
                                     1 Gas mask

10.	Administration Matters:

	a.  Administrative and Logistical support was adequate.

		(1)	Supply: Support of class I, III and V was carried by 
Troops as basic load. Initially resupply was by air. Later establishment of 
the Forward Supply Point at Dau Tieng enabled resupply to be handled 
effectively by truck.  Resupply by air was only used for mail and critically 
needed parts. 

		(2)	Maintenance: All maintenance during Operation Manhattan 
was adequate and support was well coordinated. 

		(3)	Treatment of Casualties: No unusual treatment problems 
occured. There was an increase in the usual number of MEDCAP missions during this 
operation Because of the difficulty in obtaining MEDCAP type supplies, an advance 
notification of four to five weeks is needed.

		(4)	Communication: Constant effective communications were 
maintained at all times. As a supplemental means, direct line communications 
were available. The direct support was exceptional and no communications 
equipment had more than one day down time.

	b.	Personnel analysis:
			1/4 Cav: Authorized	930	930
				 Assigned	592	613
Above figure includes Troops A, C and HQ. Troops Band D (air) were detached 
during this period.
			Present for duty        513	539

Figures do not include Troops B and D (Air) who
were detached during this Operation                        
         		Present in the Field a. 421                441
                                             b. 579                610

Figures (a) represent total for Troops A,C, and HQ. Figures (B) includes B Co. 
2 Bn, 2 Inf which was OPCON during the Operation
			Present Base Camp: HQ Trp	65	64
                                 A Trp                  13      22
                                 C Trp                  14      12

Troops B and D (Air) detached.
11.	Special Eqipment and Techniques:  None

12.	Conclusions and Lessons Learned:

	a.	Conclusions: Omitted
	b.	Lessons Learned:  Ommitted


	                                     /signed by/
	                                    ALFRED E. HUNTER
              	                            CW4, USA
	                                    Asst Adjutant

After Action Report - DALLAS - 13 Jun 67

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