Quarterhorse in Vietnam



2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division After Action Report - Tan Hiep - 4 to 6 May 1968

                                   DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
					APO 96345

AVDE-AMT							           8 August  1968

Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345


2. (U) 	Inclusive Dates:  050001 May - 062400 May 1968

3. (U)    Location:  Central LAM SON area.

4. (U)    Control Headquarters:  Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division

5. (U)    Reporting Officer:  Colonel Herman F. J. Allen, Commanding Officer, 
2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.


	a.	Brigades:

		1st Battalion, 18th Infantry
		2d Battalion, 18th Infantry
		2d Battalion, 28th Infantry
		1st Battalion, 28th Infantry
		1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
		7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
	b.	1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry

		Headquarters & Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry
		Troop "A",  1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-)
		Troop "B",  1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-)
		2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry


	a.	Artillery - 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery

	b.	US Air Force - 7th Air Force


	a.	Intelligence during this period indicates Viet Cong movement toward
        	the Saigon area.

	b.	During the contact, elements of the 165th Viet Cong Regiment were engaged.

	c.	Terrain and Weather:  Heavily populated area, jungle patches, rice paddies, and
       		rolling terrain.  Tempetures throughout the entire period ranged from moderate 
        	to hot with partly cloudy skies.

	d.	(/)  MISSION:   1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry's mission was to conduct reconnaissance 
        	in force operations Northwest of Di An.

9.	(/)  CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS;  The 1-4 Cavalry conducted reconnaissance in force 
        operations in area northwest of Di An with two troops of Armored Cavalry to 
        determine if Viet Cong were occuping the area.

10.	(/)  EXECUTION:

	a.	5 May:  Dragoon elements continued to operate out of Di An base with the mission 
       of RIF operations.  At 1323 hours, B Troop sighted one Viet Cong, then engaged, two 
       more jumped up and started to run.  Brovo engaged and was credited with 3 VC KIA (BC).  
       The 7-1 Air Cavalry Apache LFT was called on station.  At 1410 hours, Bravo Killed two 
       more VC.  At the same time, Apache received fire from a draw located at coordinates XT 
       879131.  At 1435 hours, A Troop was diverted from their RIF mission and ordered to 
       move to vicinity of coordinates XT908101 and assume RRF mission.  At 1410 hours, Apache 
       reported spotting two unmanned .50 caliber machineguns.  Bravo moved toward the area of 
       spotting and came under fire.  Apache spotted 12 VC in the same area and engaged.  At 
       1500 hours, a B Troop tank was hit by an RPG resulting in 3 WIA.  At 1546 hours, B 
       Troop had two more tanks hit with RPG's resulting in 8 WIA's.  One of the tanks was 
       burning, but all personnel had been evacuated.  Between 1625 hours and 1704 hours, 
       three air strikes were called into the area of contact, vicinity coordinates XT870131. 
       A Troop was moved into the area of contact as a relief for Bravo and continued with the 
       attack.  At 1728 hours, A Troop CO was wounded by fragments.  At 1850 hours, the VC 
       started moving toward the west in order to break contact.  A Troop continued to advance 
       and engage the retreating VC.  A Troop again started to receive heavy fire, on tank was 
       hit with a RPG.  At 1940 hours, A Troop started receiving small arms fire on their right 
       flank, and returned fire.  Contact was broken at approximately 2007 hours and returned 
       to their base locatioins.  Results of the action were 156 VC KIA (BC).  Dragoon 
       casualties, 1 KIA and 16 WIA.

	b.	6 May:  The squadron continued to conduct operations from base location at Di An.  A 
        Troop with 2/B/1-18 Infantry moved back into the area of the previous days contact.  
        By 1100 hours, Apache elements had killed 11 VC (BC).  A "Psy Ops" operation was 
        conducted at 1104 hours with negative results.  A Troop moved into the contact area 
        and immediately had 1 VC KIA.  At 1230 hours, A Troop reported finding 7 bodies.  A 
        Troop reported killing another VC at 1301 hours.  At 1320 hours, A Troop made contact 
        of their left flank.  Alpha was credited with their 3d VC KIA for the day.  At 1430 
        hours, 2/B/1-16 Infantry reported 5 VC KIA and 1 12.7mm machinegun (CHICCM).  Apache 
        got 4 more VC KIA at 1440 hours, at 1500 hours, A-16 reported VC running to his front 
        and engaged with canister.  Gunships were called in.  A Troop reported 3 US KIA at 
        1550 hours.  2/B/1-18 Infantry at 1656 hours had 1 US KIA and 1 minor US WIA.  At
        1710 hours, A Troop had one more VC KIA.  Following this, A Troop made a police of 
        the battle area and returned to base.  At 1859 hours, artillery TOT was brought into 
        the contact area along with CS gas.  Results of the day's action was 184 VC KIA (BC).  
        US casualties were 2 KIA AND 5 WIA.

	c.	18 May:  Based on interviews and interrogation of RF/FF and villagers in the area, the 
        official body count for 5-6 May was changed to 440 VC KIA (BC).

11.	(/)  RESULTS:

	a.	Enemy Losses:

		(1)    Personnel:    440 VC KIA (BC).

		(2)	Equipment:

12.7mm Machinegun     2        CHICOM commo wire             4500ft.
12.7mm Ammo	      900rds   M-14 rifle	              1
60mm mortar	      1	       75mm RR	                      1
AK-47 rifle	      15       Bargelore Torpedos             8
AK-47 ammo	      2000 rds VC cargo packs	              19
AK-47 magazines	      32       Shovels		              28
Hand Grenades	      63       Canteens	                      13
RPG-7 Launcher	      1	       Gas masks	              3
RPG-7 ammo	      20 rds   Rice		              470 lbs
RPG-2 Launcher	      1	       Peanuts		              64 lbs
RPG-2 ammo	      42 rds   Doctor's Kit		      1
CHICCM field phone    1	       Medicene		              30 lbs

	b.    Friendly Losses:    3 US KIA, 21 US WIA


	a.	Resupply was conducted from Di An Base Camp.  No emergency resupply was conducted 
        in the field.

	b.	Personnel:

Organization Designation			Opn Initiated		Opn Terminated

Squadron authorized			      890			             890
Squadron assigned			      907			             911
Squadron PDY				      723                                    711

Personnel in field			      455                                    479
Personnel in Base Camp			      263			             232

Hq & Hq, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry	       93                                    134
Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry            100                                     54
Troop B, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry            153                                     22
Troop C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry            109			              53

14.  (/)  COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:     The VC TET Offensive largely negated the pacification 
effort in the 2d Brigade Area of Operations.  Rather, all military efforts were redirected 
toward the destruction of the VC forces that infiltrated the SAIGON, THU DUC, LAI THIEU, 
and CHAU THANH area.  The Brigade was able to dominate the area and prevent large troop 
movements by following a policy of flexibility, response, and total area coverage.  The 
Brigade maintained a flexable tactical posture and outlook.  For example, when a particular 
method or area of operation ceased producing results, a unit was moved to a different area 
using another technique of employment.  The Brigade responded immediately to all hard 
intelligence. Thus preventing the VC from "getting set" for an offensive action.  A 
combination of the above, prevented the VC from moving large units through the Brigade Area 
of Operations during superb.  Each contact during this period was executed in an aggressive 
and professional manner.  The Cavalry demonstrated it's ability to accomplish any mission 
assigned, and accomplish them in an exemplary manner.


	a.	Cavalry elements work extremely well in flushing out insurgents in jungle areas 
where they have a clear base from which to work.  They are able to move through the area 
rapidly and destroy anything in their path.

	b.	Use of the "Block" formation, with all tanks forward crashing jungle, proved most 
valuable.  The ACAVS followed the tanks, providing security and command.  This produced 
maximum fire power to the front, the most likely point of contact.

	c.	It was discovered that all areas capable of concealing large groups of VC must be 
continuously screened to prevent VC build-up.  This is particularly true of areas where 
US or ARVN forces do not normally operate.  The area to the south of  PHU LOI 
(XI908101 - center of mass) is a good example. 


						     Signed by/
					           JACK E. ADAMS
					           Major, Infantry

Note: The symble (/) indicates information that was classified "Confidential" but has since 
been declassified. bb

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